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here is a prevalent assumption in South 
Africa that Parliament is guided by the 
ideals of democracy, accountability, 
transparency and accessibility. However, there 
are still gaps and challenges as far as the 
oversight role of Parliament is concerned, 
despite the presence of committees that have 
been established to oversee the executive and 
relevant structures of government, government 
activities and public finances. There is 
widespread maladministration and misuse of 
government expenditure in government 
departments. This paper investigates the 
oversight role of parliamentary committees to 
determine their relative influence on 
accountability and democracy in the execution 
of functions by public functionaries. 
The aim of the paper is to provide an 
understanding into inherent problems in the 
oversight role of Parliament in the democratic 
dispensation in South Africa, which seems not 
to have been given serious attention in the 
academia, considering the pivotal role 
Parliament plays in the lives of citizens of the 
country. These oversight committees have 
selectively held Senior Executives or Ministers 
accountable for their ineffectiveness, misuse of 
government expenditure and maladministration. 
This could be attributed to the fact that 
oversight in South Africa does not seem to be 
properly understood and implemented as it 
should be. Moreover, the influence of the 
majoritarian authority of the ruling party in 
committees seems to be colluding with the 
executive. Failure to take action against cases of 
omission brings questions on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the oversight role of 
Parliament. The adverse consequence is the 
delay in the provision of good quality services 
to poor communities. This paper employed the 
theoretical approach as a method of data 
collection. Conclusions have been drawn that 
the shortcomings of the parliamentary 
committees compromise accountability and 
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Background 
The true test of democracy is to the extent parliament ensure that government remains 
answerable to the people, which van Schalkwyk, Mmbadi and Jeewa argued is done 
through maintaining constant oversight of government’s actions (van Schalkwyk, Mmbadi 
and Jeewa, 2014:4). Parliament and its committees have powers to summon any person 
or institution to give evidence or produce documents, and to report to them. According 
to sections 55 and 56 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Parliament has 
the power to conduct oversight of all organs of State, including those at provincial and 
local government level. In terms of the historical background of the evolution of 
oversight, Parliament’s strategic vision is to build an effective people’s Parliament that is 
responsive to the needs of the people, and that is driven by the ideal of realising a 
better quality of life for all the people of South Africa, and its mission is to represent and 
act as a voice of the people in fulfilling Parliament’s constitutional functions of passing 
laws and overseeing executive actions. Based on the vision and mission of Parliament 
and the constitutional requirements, Parliament hereby develops mechanisms to guide 
its work on oversight, specifically in the form of an oversight model (van Schalkwyk et 
al., 2014:4).  
Historically, the 1994 elections ushered in a new democratic order in South Africa. 
van Schalkwyk et al., (2014:4) contend that the extraordinary participation by South 
Africans showed that they desired an end to the divisions of the past and working 
toward establishing a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights. The process of negotiations, which preceded the 1994 elections, resulted 
in the drafting of a new Constitution, as adopted on 8 May 1996 by the Constitutional 
Assembly. The mandate of Parliament is achieved through passing legislation, overseeing 
government action, facilitating public participation and international participation (van 
Schalkwyk et al., 2014:4). In line with the founding provisions of the Constitution (Act 108 
1996), the role of Parliament includes the promotion of the values of human dignity, 
equality, non-racialism, non-sexism, the supremacy of the Constitution, universal adult 
suffrage and multi-party system of democratic government.  It upholds citizens’ political 
rights, the basic values and principles governing public administration, and oversees the 
implementation of constitutional imperatives. 
Much of Parliament’s focus in the first decade of democracy was on ensuring the 
transformation of South Africa’s legislative landscape, in line with the country’s first 
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democratic Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. In this process, Parliament’s oversight function 
received less attention, further compounded by the reality that the Constitution deals 
with Parliament’s legislative authority in more detail, compared to its oversight role (van 
Schalkwyk et al., 2014:4). In giving credence to its increasing important oversight role, 
Parliament’s new strategic vision, that is, to build an effective people’s Parliament “… 
better quality of life for all the people of South Africa, underpinned the manner in which 
the organisation began engaging on the need to institutionalise public participation as 
an integral part of its oversight function (van Schalkwyk et al., 2014:4). The motivation for 
political delegations to undertake the management of the legislative and oversight 
programme of Parliament demands capacity, competence and collective action. 
Oversight is the supervision of government activities and public finances by the 
Legislature. It is a controversial concept that causes much debate among scholars, 
government and civil society. According to Redpath, Lue-Dugmore & Kagee (2006:2), it is 
difficult to ascribe a single meaning to the term oversight as it applies to Portfolio 
Committees and Select Committees. It also includes developing strategies for 
government departments, daily monitoring and evaluation. Oleszek (2010:4) states that 
oversight has two basic meanings according to the dictionary. Firstly, it denotes some 
form of legislative “supervision” or “watchfulness” of delegated authority to Executive 
branch entities and officials. Secondly, it implies a “failure to notice” something that is 
overlooked or inadvertently omitted. 
Redpath, Lue-Dugmore & Kagee (2006:2) point out that oversight covers a wide 
range of activities, including briefings, hearings, consideration of submissions, inspection 
of governmental documents ranging from strategic plans to Annual Reports and 
budgets, the approval or rejection of pending legislation, and the engagement of the 
public in all these activities. Harris (1980:9) refers to oversight as a review process, which 
suggests that oversight includes inquiries about policies that are or have been in effect, 
investigation of past administrative actions, and the calling of Executive Officers to 
account for their financial transactions. Thus, the meaning of oversight is continually 
evolving. This differentiation in meaning not only affects the general functioning of 
government activities and public finances in South Africa, but also influences 
perspectives on the adequacy and effectiveness of the practice of oversight in the South 
African Parliament. 
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Understanding the role of Parliament and oversight has not been easy in South 
Africa. It took time before Members of Parliament (MP’s) began to internalise the 
separation of powers and to expect the Executive to justify their decisions to Parliament 
and not the other way round. In fact, there was no independent and transparent 
Parliamentary oversight in South Africa before the first democratic elections of 1994 (Le 
Roux, Rupiya and Ngoma 2004:49). It is expected and required that the execution of the 
oversight system should revolve around a set of functions to be followed in order for it 
to be effective when practised. As oversight potential increases, it becomes easier to 
scrutinise and control the government and its activities, since controlling the government 
is a key component of democratic government. This contributes to a political system 
becoming more democratic in its functioning. In other words, oversight potential is a 
cause not a consequence of democratic qualities. The concept of oversight contains 
many aspects, which include political, administrative, financial, ethical, legal and strategic 
elements. The function of oversight is mandated by the Constitution, as previously 
indicated, to detect and prevent abuse. Moreover, oversight seeks to prevent arbitrary 
behaviour or illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and 
public agencies. 
The core of oversight function is to hold Executive arm of government accountable, 
and also to seek to remedy situations where the Executive has not performed according 
to its stated policies. This function includes monitoring the achievement of goals set by 
legislation and the government’s own programmes. In the light of the above, oversight 
seeks to improve transparency in government, which is itself a condition of effective 
policy implementation. 
The institutions of oversight have the potential to investigate complaints from 
government departments and present findings either to Parliament or to publish them 
on their websites to be available to the public as well. These institutions of oversight are 
guided by their mandates. The positive aspect however, is that they all share a common 
interest, which is to serve the people of the Republic of South Africa and remain 
responsible and accountable in this service. These institutions are established to assist 
and to bring the relevant information concerning government departments and their 
officials to the public. Democratic accountability requires Executive control and 
Parliamentary oversight, as well as inputs by civil society (Born and Leigh 2007). 
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Problem Statement 
In South Africa, Committees in Parliament have been established to oversee the 
executive, relevant structures of government, government activities and public finances. 
Nevertheless, these oversight committees have selectively held Senior Executives or 
Ministers accountable for their ineffectiveness, maladministration and misuse of 
government expenditure. This could be attributed to the fact that oversight in South 
Africa does not seem to be properly understood and implemented as it should be. 
Moreover, the influence of the majoritarian authority of the ruling party in committees 
seems to be colluding with the executive. There is widespread maladministration and 
misuse of government expenditure in government departments, particularly in the 
Department of Education. However, public officials and Ministers concerned are rarely 
called upon to account for this. In certain instances, the Public Service Commission, 
Public Protector, the Auditor-General, Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) 
and other State Institutions Supporting Democracy have made recommendations to 
Parliament for actions to be taken against wrong-doers, but few cases have been acted 
upon. Failure to take action against cases of omission questions effectiveness and 
efficiency in the oversight role of Parliament, which in turn compromises good 
governance and democratic accountability in the Public Service. The adverse 
consequence is the delay in the provision of good quality services to poor communities 
and the realisation of good governance. 
Below, this study seeks to bring to the fore the steps it is taking to achieve the 
intended objectives of its undertaking.  
 
Research Questions 
 Is oversight in South Africa properly understood and implemented? 
 What are the challenges in oversight? 
 How can oversight be improved? 
 
Research Objectives 
 To ascertain better understanding of oversight and its implementation. 
 To ascertain oversight dynamics in oversight.  
 To provide recommendations on the improvement of oversight.  
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On the basis of the above objectives, the research design and methodology to 
achieve the aforementioned objectives is discussed below. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
This investigation has adopted an exploratory theoretical and desktop research because 
it is practically not feasible to quantify the positive or negative ‘spin-offs’ of oversight 
from recipient communities. If the researcher would rely on officials’ empirical 
information, this would invalidate the authenticity and reliability of the findings, hence 
the theoretical approach reliance of the scholarly work. In order to answer the research 
questions and thus arrive at the goal of the research, a theoretical research analysis was 
used. Each and every data collected in this research was analysed in order to address the 
research questions. Thus, an exploratory theoretical method of inquiry allowed the 
researcher to understand the theory behind oversight and its effectiveness. According to 
Fox & Bayat (2013:30), exploration implies a large proportion of scientific management 
research is conducted to explore a topic or to provide a basic awareness of the topic. 
This approach is used when a researcher examines a new interest or when the subject of 
investigation itself is relatively new. A theory represents a mental view of a system of 
ideas or statements used as an explanation of a group of facts or phenomena such that, 
a theory forms the basis for a chain of reasoning, leading to an understanding or 
explanation of a phenomenon (Hannekom & Thornhill, 1994:480. Arguing along similar 
lines, (Asmah-Andoh 92012:12) states that any scientific study depends on the theory to 
investigate and explain the phenomena being studied with the objective to develop new 
knowledge and influence practice. 
A research design is based on a set of decisions taken regarding factors such as what 
topic is to be studied in which population and what research methods will be employed 
for that purpose (Babbie, 2013:116). Mouton and Marais (1996:32) point out that a 
research design is basically an organisation of methods and conditions to be used in the 
collection and analysis of data in way that will bring about the relevance to the research 
purpose. As such, the decisions taken regarding the manner, methods and strategies in 
which research will be conducted, so as to answer the research questions and the 
phenomenon in question, constitute a research design. Kothari (2004:31) is of the view 
that a research design is in fact the conceptual structure that covers the scope in which 
research is be carried out. Within itself, a research design comprises of the plan for the 
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collection, measurement and analysis of data. Basically, the design provides the entire 
plan in which the researcher is going to follow starting from the writing of a hypothesis 
and its operational implications to the final analysis of data. Therefore, a research design 
can be said to be that phenomenon that addresses the planning of a scientific 
investigation and the formulation of strategy for finding out something (Babbie & 
Mouton, 1998:72). In a nutshell, research design can be viewed as a plan according to 
which research participants or subject will be obtained and collect information from 
them (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2005:52). However, the definitions of research design 
can be unclear and vague at times (De Vos, 2002:137). This is due to the fact that the 
term research design has two connotations. The first being that the term refers to 
alternative logical arrangements to be selected such as experimental research designs, 
correlation research designs and others in that category. The other connotation deals 
with the designing of the study in broad. This entails all the decisions taken to plan the 
study and these decisions are not only about the overall type or the design to use but 
also about factors such as sampling, sources and procedures for collecting data, 
measurements issues and data analysis plans (Rubin & Babbie in De Vos, 2002:138). In 
the light of the above, an exploratory and desktop theoretical research method was used 
in this study. 
Research projects are bound to raise ethical considerations. This is especially true 
when research involves people directly, but it may also be the case if research is 
conducted entirely on documentary evidence (Fox & Bayat, 2013:148). Arguing along 
similar lines, Welman et al., (2005:181) point out that ethical behaviour is important in 
research, as any other field of human activity. Certain ethical considerations, concerned 
with such matters as plagiarism and honesty in reporting of results, arise in all research, 
but additional issues arise when the research involves human subjects. In line with the 
above, the researcher has a moral and professional obligation to be ethical. In so doing, 
reporting from the various sources of information consulted during the research study 
was done with honesty without distorting the ideas of authors. All sources cited in the 
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Conceptualisation of Oversight 
In the South African context, oversight is defined as a constitutionally mandated function 
of legislative organs of the State to scrutinise and oversee Executive action and any 
Organ of the State (Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson 2006: 8). Lenos (2010: 3) defines 
oversight as a key feature of Executive and Legislative relations, in which the Executive 
branch owes to the Legislative branch certain obligations and information. On the other 
hand, Lenos (2010:3) explains oversight as a supervision of the actions of administration. 
Such supervision includes, but is not limited to hearings, summoning of Ministers, 
resolutions of enquiry, Special Inventory Committees, and confirmation processes. A 
number of explanations provided in the study suggest that oversight is part of the 
institutional design established to guarantee a certain degree of control against 
excessive executive power, which is a fundamental component of a democratic 
government. 
For the purposes of the study, the following working definition of parliamentary 
oversight will be used: “the review, monitoring and supervision of government and 
public agencies, including the implementation of policy and legislation” (The Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Act 108 of 1996). This definition focuses on the 
purpose and nature of oversight activities rather than on the procedural stages in which 
oversight activities take place. According to Yamamoto (2007:9-10), the key functions of 
parliamentary oversight are described as: 
 To detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour, or illegal and unconstitutional 
conduct on the part of the Government and public agencies. At the core of this 
function is the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens. 
 To hold the Government accountable with respect to how the money of 
taxpayers is used. Parliamentary oversight detects waste within the machinery of 
the Government and public agencies. Thus, it can improve efficiency, economy 
and effectiveness of government operations. 
 To ensure that policies announced by the Government and authorised by 
Parliament are actually implemented. This function includes monitoring the 
achievement of goals as set by legislation, the programmes of the Government, 
and the ten tools of Parliamentary oversight. 
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 To improve transparency of government operations and enhance the trust of 
the public in government, which is itself a condition of effective policy delivery. 
Parliaments use various tools in performing the abovementioned functions. Some of 
these tools are stipulated in the constitutions of countries, but more commonly they are 
part of the rules that govern parliamentary procedures (such sets of rules are often 
called standing orders). In South Africa, when Parliament is exercising oversight, it 
focuses on the following areas: 
 Implementation of laws. 
 Application of budgets. 
 Strict observance of laws of Parliament and the Constitution. 
 Effective management of government departments (www.parliament.gov.za). 
  
Challenges of Parliamentary Oversight in South Africa 
Pelizo, Stapenhurst and Olson (2006) argue that effective parliamentary oversight is 
essential to the quality of a democracy. The executive, in carrying out its tasks through 
implementing legislation or policy, acquires considerable power, such as the ability to 
influence or determine the conduct of a person. In a constitutional democracy, the 
condition for exercising that power is that the administration or executive must be 
checked by being held accountable to an organ of government that is distinct from it. 
This notion is inherent in the concept of the separation of powers, which simultaneously 
provides for checks and balances on the exercise of executive power, making the 
executive more accountable to an elected legislature. Again, the study finds it 
challenging for parliamentary committees who have to practise oversight, while being 
composed of the majority of the ruling party. Where it becomes a challenge is when 
they have to hold senior members of the same organisation, or party, to be accountable. 
Without being unreasonable, it is clear that some of these Ministers are their comrades 
or even seniors, thus the study finds this a challenge to the practice of oversight in 
Parliament. For committee oversight to be relatively effective, it would be advisable to 
consider the rotation of the chairing of committees so that it does not become a 
preserve of the majority party as it is currently the practice. Moreover, reaching of 
decisions in these committees through voting should be reviewed and consensus in 
decision-making should be embraced in order to accommodate opposing views of the 
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minority parties. This would significantly reduce the number of court cases which have 
become a trend when opposition parties pursue the litigation route when they are 
disgruntled that their views are not given the necessary consideration.    
According to Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau (1999:4), effective and proper oversight of 
the executive thus requires Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of the Executive 
to fully understand the constitutional justifications and rationale behind accountability in 
government, and the purpose they serve. Accountability and oversight can be at their 
most effective if they are recognised by those in power as the central organising 
principles of the South African Constitution. The oversight role is often seen as that of 
opposition parties alone, designed to police and expose maladministration and 
corruption. Such a view is limited and deficient. Oversight and accountability, however, 
help to ensure that the Executive implements laws in a way that is required by the 
Legislature and the dictates of the South African Constitution. The legislature is in this 
way able to keep control over the laws that it passes and to promote the constitutional 
values of accountability and good governance. 
Thus, oversight must be seen as one of the central tenets of the South African 
democracy because through it the Legislature can ensure that the Executive is carrying 
out its mandate, it monitors the implementation of its legislative policy, and draws on 
these experiences for future law-making. Through oversight South Africa can ensure 
effective government. When seen in this light, the oversight functions of the Legislature 
complements rather than hampers the effective delivery of services with which the 
Executive is entrusted. 
 
Accountability as Deliberate Measure of Oversight 
The concept of accountability in this study refers to ethics and good governance. 
According to Dykstra (1939:1-25), the concept is often used synonymously with concepts 
such as responsibility, answerability, blameworthiness, liability, and other terms 
associated with the expectation of accountability. As an aspect of governance, 
accountability has been central to discussions related to problems in the public sector, 
non-profit organisations and private organisations. Tumushabe, Mushemeza, Tamale, 
Lukwayo, and Ssemakula (2010:19) define accountability as an acknowledgement and 
assumption of responsibility for actions, products, decisions and policies, including 
administration, governance and implementation within the scope of the role or 
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employment position. Tumushabe et al., (2010:19) further explain accountability as 
encompassing the obligation to report, explain and to answer for consequences. 
The study confirms that accountability on its own is said to be the hallmark of 
modern democratic governance. In other words, democracy remains outdated if those in 
power cannot be held accountable in public for their acts, omissions, decisions, 
expenditure or policies. Historically, the concept of accountability was closely linked to 
financial accounting. However, it has now moved far beyond this and has become a 
symbol of good governance in both the public and private sectors. It must be noted that 
the ultimate goal of oversight function of the Portfolio Committee on Education is to 
ensure that those entrusted with public money are held accountable in the manner in 
which tax payers’ money is spent (www.parliament.gov.za). 
 
Oversight Committees in Parliament 
Committees are universally found in Parliaments across the world. According to 
Yamamoto (2007:15), a Parliamentary Committee is a group of parliamentarians 
appointed by one chamber or both to undertake certain tasks. Yamamoto (2007:26) 
argues that the scope of the activities of permanent committees is limited by the rules 
under which they are established. Working in Committees allows Parliament to increase 
the amount of work that can be done and ensure that issues can be debated in more 
detail than in plenary sessions. Moreover, Committees increase the level of participation 
of MPs in discussions and enables them to develop expertise and in-depth knowledge of 
the specific Committee’s area of work. Furthermore, they provide a platform for the 
public to present views directly to MPs, something that is not possible in a plenary 
sitting of Parliament. 
On the other hand, Committees usually have the authority to decide whether or not 
a hearing should be open to the public. Committees also provide an environment for 
Parliament to hear evidence and collect information related to the work of a specific 
committee. Committees are, in general, proportionally representative of the parties in 
Parliament. Aldons (1985:333-351) believes that Parliamentary Oversight Committees 
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The Definition of the Portfolio Committee on Education 
The Portfolio Committee on Education is one of the Committees found in the National 
Assembly (NA) and its members are appointed by their fellow members. This committee 
is comprised of two bodies namely, the Portfolio Committee on Basic Education as well 
as the Portfolio Committee on Higher Education. According to Chaka, Bhagwam and 
Govender (2010:13), each portfolio committee in Parliament has between 17 and 19 full 
members and several alternate members. As it is acceptable that members of Portfolio 
Committees serve on more than one Portfolio Committee, it is a fact that this could also 
harm the effectiveness and efficiency of the Committee system. 
Chaka et al., (2010:14) further explain that each Portfolio Committee has to elect a 
Chairperson, whose role is to preside over meetings and to ensure free participation by 
all members regardless of the political party they represent. Furthermore, Chairpersons 
are also responsible for allowing access by the public to Portfolio Committee meetings. 
In fact, these Committees are allocated a secretary and/or co-ordinator, as well as a 
researcher to provide them with the necessary support. Most committees have their own 
researcher, but some committees share a researcher. Furthermore, this committee 
reports directly to Parliament. 
 
The Functions of the Portfolio Committee on Education  
According to Chaka et al., (2010:16), the functions of the Portfolio Committee on 
Education are the legislative function, the policy function, overseeing the Department of 
Basic Education and the Department of Higher Education and Training, and other 
statutory bodies, and addressing issues of concern. 
 
The Legislative Function 
According to Chaka et al., (2010:17), this function involves discussing and amending 
education Bills, following their introduction in the NA. A Bill could be introduced by the 
Minister, the Portfolio Committee or by an individual Member. The Cabinet then 
approves the Bill after it has been introduced by the Minister of Education before it goes 
to the Legislature. In other words, once a Bill has been introduced, it is referred to the 
Portfolio Committee for consideration. The Committee recommends whether or not the 
Bill should be approved (deliberated through a motion of desirability in the Committee 
itself), and whether it needs amendments. It could decide to invite public participation 
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by means of written submissions and public hearings before it prepares its 
recommendations. Parliament can send a Bill back for further consideration by the 
Committee, if it is not satisfied.  
In ordinary Bills not affecting provinces (Section 75 Bill), once a Section 75 Bill has 
been passed by the National Assembly (NA), it is referred to the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP). If the NCOP amends the Bill or rejects it, it goes back to the Assembly 
that may pass the Bill again, with or without amendments, and send it for the President’s 
assent. In other words, the Assembly can pass a Section 75 Bill even if the NCOP 
disagrees (www.parliament.gov.za). In ordinary Bills affecting provinces (Section 76 Bills), 
the NCOP and the NA both consider Section 76 Bills. If they cannot agree, the dispute is 
referred to the Mediation Committee. If the committee is unable to secure agreement on 
Section 76 Bills introduced by the NA within 30 days, the Bill may be passed by the NA 
with a with a two-thirds majority and sent to the President. If the committee cannot 
broker an agreement on Bills that have been introduced in the NCOP, the Bill lapses 
(www.parliament.gov.za). If approved by Parliament, the Bill becomes an Act and is sent 
to the President for assent. Once the President signs it, the Act becomes law. The 
President has the power to send legislation back to Parliament for further consideration 
if it does not meet the requirements of the Constitution. This also relates to Bills 
affecting provinces, which are also considered in the National Council of Provinces. 
 
The Policy Function 
This function is mainly dealing with, debating and reviewing policies. Since 1994, the 
Committee has considered numerous policies, some of which revolved around the 
following:  
 Language in Education Policy (1997)  
 Norms and Standards for School Funding (1998)  
 White Paper 5 on Early Childhood Development (2001)  
 White Paper 6 on Special Needs Education (2001) 
 National Curriculum Statement (2002) 
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Overseeing the Departments of Education and Statutory Bodies 
This is another function of the Portfolio Committee on Education, which is meant to 
monitor and oversee the work of the Departments of Education, as well as related 
statutory bodies. According to Chaka et al., (2010:20), this function, however, is 
performed in a number of ways such as: 
Examining and debating strategic plans and budgets 
Strategic plans are usually drawn up for a five-year period, to list the strategic 
objectives for the period, as well as the performance measures for these 
objectives. These plans are presented to the Portfolio Committee for comment 
and discussion. The Committee will look at the education budget in relation to 
the strategic plans drawn up by the Departments of Education to ensure that 
the allocations are in line with the plans. For example, the Portfolio Committee 
can question the Department on increases or decreases in the budget and their 
extent in relation to items prioritised in the departmental strategic plans. 
Examining annual reports 
Once a year, the Education Portfolio Committee reviews Annual Reports of the 
Departments and Statutory Bodies. It examines how the Departments or 
Statutory Bodies went about implementing their programmes, as well as what 
was achieved and the challenges faced. Financial statements also tell how much 
money was available and how much was spent. Reasons for under-spending or 
over-spending are also explored. 
Site visits 
As part of its oversight function, this Committee sometimes conducts site visits. 
For example, the Committee has checked on various issues such as school 
infrastructure and school nutrition by visiting various schools. Information 
obtained through site visits is used when questioning the Departments of 
Education on specific matters. 
Addressing issues of public concerns 
This function is meant to bring together the Departments of Education and the 
public in order to discuss any matter of concern arising between the two 
stakeholders. For instance, the Portfolio Committee may hold debates or public 
hearings on anything that it considers to be of concern and relevant to the 
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delivery of any aspect of education. In addressing issues of concern, the 
Portfolio Committee may invite various local, regional and international experts 
to share information. This helps Committee Members to make more informed 
decisions and to make better recommendations in the future. However, the 
public may participate in the work of the Education Portfolio Committee in 
various ways, such as attending meetings, making written submissions, 
attending public hearings as well as alerting constituency offices to a problem. 
 
Analysis of the Oversight Role of the Portfolio Committee on 
Education 
Mindful of the critical role of oversight by the Portfolio Committee of Education on the 
department officials, the point needs to be made that it does not guarantee 
effectiveness and efficiency. The critique of the oversight role of the Portfolio Committee 
focuses on its supervision or “watchfulness” of delegated authority to public officials of 
the Department of Education and the failure of the Portfolio Committee to notice 
something that is overlooked or inadvertently omitted. Mindful of the fact that there are 
numerous oversight mechanisms that committees utilise, this paper has confined itself in 
selected tools of oversight, which have been identified to have deficiencies or challenges.  
 
Policy and Legislative Function 
According to Chaka et al. (2007:8), legislative oversight is considered an important duty 
in the promotion and protection of public interest. This involves debating and reviewing 
policies and discussing and amending Education Bills. The Committee could decide to 
invite public participation by means of written submissions and public hearings before it 
propose its recommendations. 
The author’s observation has been that the public has rarely been invited to make 
written submission or participate in public hearings, except to those Bills that have 
contentious issues. When the public is invited, it is given short notice. The invitation is 
mainly in newspapers, which excludes the majority of the people who cannot afford to 
buy newspapers or are unable to read. As a consequence, only the elite groups of civil 
society are afforded the opportunity to participate in these public hearings. The elite 
groups represent their interests on the pretext that they represent the views of the 
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broader communities. This state of affairs cannot be seen as meaningful participation of 
communities in the legislative process of the Portfolio Committee. 
 
Overseeing the Departments of Education and Statutory Bodies 
In overseeing the Departments of Education and Statutory Bodies, the Education 
Portfolio Committee examines and debates the strategic plans and the budget for the 
Department and the Statutory Bodies. The Committee interrogates the Education Budget 
in relation to the strategic plans drawn up by the Department to ensure that allocations 
are in line with the plans. It questions the Department on increases or decreases in the 
budget and their extent in relation to items prioritised in the Departmental Strategic 
Plans. 
The problem with the Committee is that it does not go beyond asking whether the 
money was spent as budgeted to establish proper prioritisation in order to alleviate 
poverty. In most cases, interrogation of the Department of Education officials relates to 
whether the money was spent as appropriated, and does not focus on establishing 
whether it brought about changes in terms of improving the quality of lives for the 
targeted communities. In other words, the outcomes of the Departments’ spending 
remain hidden from scrutiny by the community as the measurement of progress is not 
given serious attention. 
 
Examining Annual Reports 
Once a year, the Education Portfolio Committee reviews Annual Reports of the 
Departments and Statutory Bodies. It examines how the Department and Statutory 
Bodies went about implementing their programmes, what was achieved and the 
challenges faced. Financial statements also tell how much money was available and how 
much was spent. The Committee also holds public officials to account for under-
spending and over-spending. However, considering that Department officials and 
Statutory Bodies are skilled in compiling these reports and are familiar with the kinds of 
questions that are likely to be asked, authentic accountability regarding these reports 
becomes questionable as collation of data becomes a routine exercise that is done with 
expert knowledge. The Committee does not do follow-ups on concerns raised nor does 
it monitor officials of the Department and Statutory Bodies. As a result, the following 
year these officials brief Members of the Committee on their programmes for that 
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particular year, which defeats the purpose of holding the Departments and Statutory 
Body officials to account. 
 
Site Visits 
As part of its oversight function, this Committee sometimes conducts site visits. For 
example, the Committee has checked on various issues such as school infrastructure and 
school nutrition by visiting various schools. Information obtained through site visits is 
used when questioning the Departments of Education on specific matters. 
The problem however, is the fact that these site visits are rarely conducted and when 
the Committee visits the school, it is usually only when there is a crisis situation. In other 
words, site visits are often conducted in reaction to a problem that exists, instead of 
being done proactively. As a result, by the time the Committee visits a school, teachers 
would be made aware and Members of the Committee would find that stability has been 
restored, which is counterproductive to the good intention of conducting site visits. 
 
Calling of Executive Officers to account for financial transactions 
When there are allegations of misappropriation of funds or embezzlement of taxpayers’ 
money by any of the public officials, the Accounting Officer is summoned to appear 
before the Committee to account for financial transactions. However, the Committee has 
selectively held Senior Executives or Ministers accountable for their ineffectiveness, 
maladministration and misuse of government expenditure. This could be attributed to 
the fact that oversight in South Africa does not seem to be properly understood and 
implemented as it should be. Moreover, the influence of the majoritarian authority of the 
ruling party in committees seems to be colluding with the executive. In certain instances, 
the Public Service Commission, Public Protector, the Auditor-General, Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and other State Institutions Supporting 
Democracy have made recommendations to Parliament for action to be taken against 
wrong doers, but few cases have been acted upon. Failure to take action against cases 
of omission could bring questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight 
role of the Committee, which compromises good governance and democratic 
accountability in the Public Service. The adverse consequence is the delay in the 
provision of good quality services to poor communities and the realisation of good 
governance. 
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Conclusion 
The journal article concludes that oversight is a critical instrument for Parliament to 
oversee the performance of departments, which focuses on promoting good governance. 
However, the implementation challenges confronting oversight compromise the 
existence of this instrument to support the mandate of Parliament. Among other 
challenges identified in this article include ineffective method of invitation of the public 
to policy and legislative function, challenges with overseeing the Departments of 
Education and Statutory Bodies, ineffectiveness in examining annual reports, site visits 
that are seldom or reactively conducted, and selective calling of Executive Officers to 
account for financial transactions. This means that proper solutions should be analysed 




One of the research objectives of the study was to provide recommendations against 
oversight challenges. Based on the study’s findings, various recommendations can be 
made. 
Ineffective method of invitation of the public to policy and legislative function 
Considering that legislative oversight is considered an important duty in the promotion 
and protection of public interest, it is suggested that the Committee could decide to 
invite public participation within reasonable time by means of written submissions and 
public hearings before it propose its recommendations. Other forms of communication 
for invitation to participate in public hearings, such as radio and mass meetings at 
grassroots should be given serious consideration in order to reach out to the broader 
communities. 
Challenges in overseeing the Departments of Education and Statutory Bodies 
Considering the fact that the political and economic structures have moved from a white 
nationalist government to that of a democratic multi-party government, Parliament 
should undertake the responsibility of ensuring that the operation and management of 
government activities and public finances are effectively managed to redress past 
inequalities, injustices and oppression through the effective and efficient running of the 
Portfolio Committee on Education. This should involve review, monitoring and 
supervision of government and public agencies, including the implementation of policy 
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and legislation. In pursuit of good governance, it becomes critically important to be able 
to measure the quality of governance. Governance in the Portfolio Committee on 
Education is about how the Departments and Statutory Bodies ensure that they are 
doing the right things in the right way for teachers and learners, in a timely, inclusive, 
open, honest and accountable manner. A wider meaning of governance is that it relates 
to the capacity of a nation to provide its citizens with the choice of representation and 
unhindered participation in decision-making. It is understandable that governance is the 
style of interaction between a government and its people.  
Ineffectiveness in examining annual reports  
The key functions of Parliamentary oversight should be to detect and prevent abuse, 
arbitrary behaviour or illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the 
government, especially through the Portfolio Committee on Education. At the core of the 
Portfolio’s functions should be the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens to 
hold the government accountable with respect to how the money of taxpayers is used. 
The reason to emphasise these functions is to ensure that Parliamentary oversight of the 
Portfolio Committee on Education detects waste within the machinery of the 
Departments of Education and Statutory Bodies. This should be done while bearing in 
mind that civil society has high hopes and expectations about the tangible benefits of 
democracy and the Education System in South Africa. 
Site visits seldom or reactively conducted 
It is advisable that the Committee should be proactive and conduct regular unexpected 
visits to schools besides reactive interventions during crisis situations. Regular 
unexpected visits to schools could be a deterrent to inept and lack of work ethic by 
public functionaries in the Ministry of Education and, would in turn, militate against 
maladministration and corrupt tendencies. 
Selective calling of Executive Officers to account for financial transactions 
When there are allegations of misappropriation of funds or embezzlement of taxpayers’ 
money by any of the public officials, the Accounting Officer is summoned to appear 
before the Committee to account for financial transactions. However, the Committee has 
selectively held Senior Executives or Ministers accountable for their ineffectiveness, 
maladministration and misuse of government expenditure. This could be attributed to 
the fact that oversight in South Africa does not seem to be properly understood and 
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implemented as it should be. Moreover, the influence of the majoritarian authority of the 
ruling party in committees seems to be colluding with the executive. In certain instances, 
the Public Service Commission, Public Protector, the Auditor-General, Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and other State Institutions Supporting 
Democracy have made recommendations to Parliament for action to be taken against 
wrong doers, but few cases have been acted upon. Failure to take action against cases 
of omission could bring questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight 
role of the Committee, which compromises good governance and democratic 
accountability in the Public Service. The adverse consequence is the delay in the 
provision of good quality services to poor communities and the realisation of good 
governance. 
Considering that accountability is an acknowledgement and assumption of 
responsibility for actions, products, decisions and policies, including administration, 
governance and implementation within the scope of the role or employment position, 
the ultimate goal of the oversight function of the Portfolio Committee on Education is to 
ensure that those entrusted with public money are held accountable in the manner in 
which taxpayers’ money is spent. Accountability in its broadest sense is an obligation to 
expose, explain and justify actions. Therefore, the requirement that the Executive must 
justify its policies and decisions to Parliament is only one mechanism for ensuring 
accountability. These requirements that officials should provide reasons for their 
decisions according to Section 33(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
that freedom of information legislation should be drafted and that there should be a 
judicial review of administrative action, are all means of making the Executive 
accountable for the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the committee should be mindful 
of the need for Executive Officers compliance with the Financial Management of 
Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act of 2009 and the Constitution, which should be 
enforced, upheld and protected. There is, in particular, a need for ethical leadership 
among public functionaries and politicians entrusted with State power and public 
resources. Parliament should explore best practices and share lessons of experience with 
other countries, particularly in decision-making in committee work. Values-based 
leadership by political representatives should involve decision-making in the committee 
work that is informed by values and principles such as honesty, public interest, people 
first, equality, the rule of law and constitutional supremacy. 
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